

Melissa Marie Bruno

December 14 2007

Artistic Mediations: an Analysis of Stephen Dedalus, the Creative Pervert

In both James Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses*, Stephen Dedalus struggles with artistic conception. Stephen's perception of art, his aesthetic theory, changes substantially from book to book. In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Stephen famously states that "[t]he artist, like the God of creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails" (233); however, in *Ulysses*, this assertion is altered: Stephen reintroduces the artist into art with the intention of immortalizing him(self). In "Proteus," while searching for inspiration, Stephen speculates as to whether or not he is "walking into eternity" (*Ulysses* 45), suggesting that he considers the path of art the means to obtaining immortality. Consequently, Stephen is so preoccupied with artistic pre-eminence that he is stunted, unable to actualize his ambitions. He is incapable of creating art because, rather than being inspired, he is fueled by vanity. Moreover, artistic creation itself is "humbled" in light of divine creation. The sheer notion that Stephen is reliant on external sources to fuel and inspire his artistic endeavors suggests that he will never be able to truly create anything which is his own: he cannot beget art. Therefore, Stephen's art is merely a reworking of creation, a perversion of God's design. As such, in this essay I will venture to diagnose the dilemma of "authentic" creation through a Christian lens, while using the theories of Aristotle, Aquinas, Lacan, and Plato to explore Stephen's inability to produce art.

In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Stephen is captivated with the word "Foetus" which he sees carved on a desk. From this one word, Stephen experiences an

imaginative vision, instigating his fascination with creation on a psychosomatic terrain: the liaison between the body and mind, external and internal, epitomizes the nature of his creative process. For instance, after perceiving the word, “Foetus”,

The sudden legend startled [Stephen’s] blood: he seemed to feel the absent students of the college about him and to shrink from their company. A vision of their life, which his father’s words had been powerless to evoke, sprang up before him out of the word cut in the desk. A broadshouldered student with a moustache was cutting in the letters with a jackknife, seriously. Other students stood or sat near him laughing at his handiwork, one jogged elbow. The big student turned on him, frowning. He was dressed in loose grey clothes and had tall boots (*Portrait* 95).

From one word, Stephen’s mind conducts him through an imaginative scenario. Taken literally, the word “foetus” means undeveloped, unformed, and unborn life, paralleling Stephen’s inability to do anything more than hypothesize artistically. Drawing on Christian theology, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1), Stephen’s creative process is triggered out of the Word of God (being language, manifestation of vision, and creation); therefore, Stephen is reliant on God’s creations to fuel his creativity, necessitating external influences to instigate his internal probings, his “art.” Stephen struggles with actualizing his art externally; he is unable to weld the fluidity of his imagination into something tangible. As such, Stephen is left longing to bring his art to fruition, yearning to tap into the principle of creation rather than merely aping the divine power.

Transitioning to *Ulysses*, in “Proteus” we find Stephen pining to return to the origins of creation where God’s Word created mankind, insinuating that he feels himself

not only worthy, but capable of creating out of nothing. In book four of Homer's the *Odyssey*, in the court of Telemachus, Menelaus is describing how, in the course of his return home to Troy, he "did not know which of the gods had him pinned down for [...] neglect[ing] [...] the rules of sacrifice; nor [...] how to return home" (Gifford 44). As such, Proteus's daughter "[takes] pity on Menelaus and [...] tell[s] him that her father has the power of prophecy. To get Proteus to speak, Menelaus would have to grasp and hold him even though he would 'take the forms/ of all beasts, and water, and blinding fire'" (44). Therefore, a 'protean' character is multifarious, being motley and fluid in composition. As Sheldon Brivic suggests, "'formless [protean] matter' [is] an intermediate stage between immaterial God and the world. God had to create formless or primal matter before he gave it the specific forms of creatures" (39). Therefore, Stephen's assertion "put me onto edenville" (*Ulysses* 46), with Eden being in-between heaven and earth, the place where God created man, insinuates that Stephen wants to return to original creation. Moreover, the stage of "primal matter[,] [an] impenetrability in space and inevitable or uninterrupted extension in time" (Gifford 44), is where Stephen believes he could, like God, immortalize his artistic vision. This ambition is blasphemous and, most significantly, satanic insofar as Stephen is placing man (himself) on a par with God, "nebeneinander."¹

Transitioning to *Paradise Lost*, Milton depicts the satanic ethos of placing God's creations in a "mutual league" (I. 87) with God himself. Stephen, like Satan, is created by God; therefore, the suggestion of returning to original creation, "alelph, alpha: nought, nought, one" (*Ulysses* 46), which Gifford delineates as the "initial letters of the Hebrew

¹ Literally translated as "side by side."

and Greek alphabets²” (46) and “creation (as only God can create) from nothing” (46), is impiously irreverent. The notion of “creation from nothing” (46) is impossible, unless you are God himself. This diagnoses Stephen’s struggle with creating authentic art: he cannot create of himself because he is God’s creation, not God himself, thus elucidating how a solipsistic perception of artistic creation is highly problematic. Furthermore, it is hubristic to think one’s self capable of God’s design, owing no tribute to anything higher than creation itself. This ethos parallels Satan insofar as he professes that he is “self begot, self raised” (V. 860) “know[ing] none before [him]” (V. 860); hence, the notion of creation without any tribute to God is satanic.

In Christian theology, man is created in God’s image. Considering that God is the supreme creator of everything, and man is created in His image, man is created with God’s creative impulse. Therefore, can man be a creator too, or can he only perpetuate God’s design? If anything, God gives man a perspective on life with which he can manipulate what has already been created, ultimately, creatively perverting God’s creation. Therefore, Stephen’s notion of “creation from nothing”(Ulysses 46) is reminiscent of Satan insofar as Satan cannot create *ex nihilo*, but can only pervert the world around him. This is evidenced by Satan’s rebellious resolve stating

If then His providence

Out of our evil seek to bring forth good

Our labor must be to pervert that end

And out of good still find means of evil (I 162-5)

² It is important to note that the signification of these two languages. With Jesus being Jewish, Hebrew is the language that he spoke and the language through which God’s will was first communicated. And, being a reworking of Homer’s *Odyssey*, Greek is a reference to the language used by Homer, and to the Greek gods themselves. Moreover, the Old Testament was originally written in Hebrew, and the New Testament was written in Greek.

This declaration is echoed in Stephen's question "will you be as gods?" (*Ulysses* 46), paralleling Satan's coaxing Eve to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thus corrupting the innocence of God's creation. The only thing that Satan can do is disfigure God's creations by perverting and tempting them into sin and destruction.

Similarly, Stephen takes the sanctity of God's creation and deforms it in his mind; he perceives the world around him and perverts it, mentally. As such, this suggests that art is a perversion of nature. For instance, upon seeing two women on the beach, Stephen takes their images and traces them in his imagination, thus superimposing his narrative onto them, rendering them into a product of his vision. He imagines them to be midwives with "a misbirth with a trailing navel cord, hushed in ruddy wool" (46), and this cord, linked to all, a "strandentwining cable of all flesh" (46), reaching all the way back to Eve who "had no navel" (46), a "belly without blemish" (46). In other words, he takes the "signatures of all things [he] [is] here to read" (45) and interprets them. Therefore, his artistic process is rooted in God's creation, making his 'own' an elaboration on what already exists. This notion is exemplified by the fact that even Stephen's poem³ is a reworking of Hyde's poem "My Grief on the Sea,"⁴ insinuating that "originality" is a hubristic belief and is a plagiarized delusion because it has all been done before and done better, by God. This can be paralleled to Satan's assertion that "[t]he mind is its own place and it itself / [c]an make a Heaven of hell, a Hell of Heaven" (I. 254-5) because it suggests that one's mind is an abode of freewill, being able to mutate everything, in a protean fashion, as one desires. Therefore, when Stephen translates intimations and

³ On Swift sail flaming
From storm and south
He comes pale vampire
Mouth to my mouth (*Ulysses* 168)

⁴ And my Love came behind me,
He came from the South;
His breast to my bosom,
His mouth to my mouth (Hyde l. 21-25)

images of the physical and material world in his mind, he is perverting them in a satanic fashion. This further embeds Stephen within the satanic ethos because Satan himself wants to be a creator; however, he cannot be. Ultimately, this mentality invokes a satanic form of art insofar as “[t]he decreation of one world serves the creation of another” (Brivic 45). This satanic impulse to pervert and manipulate mirrors the artist’s impulse to (de/re)create insofar as the artist strives to actualize his vision, creating an imprint, a signature, of his own. The desire for immortality through art is subversive, selfish, and satanic in that it focuses on a motivation outside of one’s art itself, making art the means of achieving recognition. As such, the ‘artist’ is more important than his art, as it serves to immortalize his individuality.

The excessive concentration on individualism is a solipsistic isolation of the self, and ultimately, is satanic. Without acknowledging anything outside one’s self, one’s mind becomes the pinnacle of one’s existence. This attitude lends itself to Stephen’s relationship with his parents. Stephen describes how he was “[w]ombed in the sin of darkness [...], made not begotten. By them, the man with [his] voice and [his] eyes and a ghostwoman with ashes on her breath. (*Ulysses* 46-7). Stephen feels as though he owes his parents nothing because they simply “made” him. In other words, the only connection Stephen acknowledges with his parents is the mere fact of being their offspring; aside from that, he is his own entity, completely independent of them. In theology, the notion of being “made not begotten”(46), suggests that “he is a man rather than the Son of God, but [it] may also be taken to mean that he is a product of art rather than natural reproduction” (Brivic 77); therefore, his parents “reproduced” him, but he is a product of something larger than them both. Furthermore, this notion that “He willed me and now may not will me away or ever” (*Ulysses* 47) suggests that Stephen is even

outside of God's control insofar as it was God's will to create him, but now that he has been created, even God cannot "will him away." Stephen draws upon the theory of "lex eterna"⁵ (47) which is, according to Thomas Aquinas, "the ruling idea of things which exists in God as the effective sovereign of them all has the nature of law" (Gifford 47); "the eternal concept of divine law bears the character of a law that is eternal as being God's ordination for the governance of things he foreknows" (47). In other words, this concept can be paralleled to the divine will insofar as because God cannot unwill creation, He cannot absolve humanity of their freewill. In this respect, Stephen is positioning himself out of reach of God's will, essentially leaving him to his own devices, outside of anything larger that might restrain him. Stephen states that "you behold in me [...] a horrible example of free thought" (*Ulysses* 23), suggesting that his art, being a product of his mind, is unbridled and uninhibited.

However, the notion of genuine creativity is further complicated by contemplating the concept of freewill within a world where God has already perfected creation. From this paradox questions arise: what is (artistic) freewill within the restrictions of God's established creation? And, where/what is the function of art within a world already formed/conceived? Sheldon Brivic argues "[b]ecause Joyce could never subordinate himself to God, he could accept the world only by making it a product of his imaginative will" (45); therefore, Joyce exercises his (free)will by articulating his imagination, the protean formless matter of his mind, sustaining and solidifying his vision within a literary niche. In other words, freewill is God's gift to humanity ---humanity's defining characteristic; any exertion of it, artistic or not, is really a realization of His gift. Freewill is, by nature, outside God's control; He can foresee the negative implications of freewill,

⁵ Literally translated as "eternal law."

but He does not intervene and deprive humanity of it, even if that means that evil will ensue. We are given the ability to choose to submit to God's will, ultimately placing humanity on a moral ledge because we are also given the liberty to refute and divorce ourselves from God's grace: the satanic "courage never to submit or yield" (Milton I. 108), "[f]or the mind and spirit remains / [i]nvincible" (I. 139-40). Stephen's mantra from *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, "non serviam", is an assertion of his individualism; however, in religious terms, he is undeniably subordinate to God considering that God is all powerful and created everything: "the everlasting God, the Lord / the Creator of the ends of the earth" (Is 40:28). However, in *Ulysses*, Stephen alters his perception stating that he is "another now and the same. A servant too. A server of a servant" (12). Stephen still acknowledges and identifies with his previous stature: he is still the "same" person, but is not as naïve in his beliefs because if one is a true catholic, like Stephen claims to be, then one must choose to submit one's self to the preachings of the church. Therefore, this progression demonstrates Stephen's "respect [for] liberty" (*Ulysses* 56) and his gift of freewill. Stephens recognizes that God's "truth shall make [him] free" (John 8:32), for while he may be subservient to God, "[he] will not be master of others or their slave" (*Ulysses* 56) because a servant (of God) has an option: a servant has freewill whereas a slave does not. Returning to art and creation, an artist has the liberty to create; however, it is only as authentic as God has allowed. One is free to create the endless imaginings of one's mind, but that mind is created by God, making His mind the only one truly capable of "creation from nothing" (*Ulysses* 46).

If art is a manifestation of the imagination, it is irreverent to think that one's art is purely a product of one's self/imagination. Therefore, the mind itself is the playing field of artistic delusion. Plato, in the *Republic*, has similar ideas, suggesting that art is the

lowest form because it merely replicates and mimics unsuccessfully what is already perfected in “heaven.”⁶ Plato describes how “figures that [are] [made] and draw[n], of which shadows and reflections in water are images, [are] use[d] as images, in seeking to see [...] that [which] one cannot see except by means of thought” (*Republic* VI 510e); therefore, “the soul is forced to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not travelling up to a first principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypothesis” (VI 511a). As such, Stephen says “I throw this ended shadow from me, manshape ineluctable, call it back. Endless, would it be mine, form from my form?” (*Ulysses* 69). In throwing his shadow, casting it away from him, Stephen rejects the forms around him, even his own. The notion of “manshape” is suggestive of how man is “ineluctably” created in God’s form, thus insinuating Stephen’s frustration with originality, especially insofar as his own form is not original. Ultimately, it is a replication of God’s perfected form; therefore, in dispelling his shadow, is also trying to sever the looming reminder that he too is a form of a form. In addition, by shedding the shadow of his form, Stephen desires to embrace the formless and tap into the origins of creation, or in Plato’s terms, “the first principle.” In “call[ing] it back” (*Ulysses* 69), Stephen attempts to summon that original principle, the form from which he is formed. Furthermore, according to Plato, one is able to draw “a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms” (*Republic* VI 511c); therefore, Stephen’s question “endless, would it be mine, form from my form?” (*Ulysses* 69) echoes the uncertainty surrounding forms and originality for one must “beware of imitations” (63). As such, Stephen concludes that “thought is the thought of thought. [...] The soul

⁶ Plato does use the term “heaven.” Considering that I have been analyzing the dialectic of art through a Christian lens, God’s domain, heaven, is the biblical parallel to Plato’s sovereign of the visual (VI 509d), the place of all original images (VI 510a)

is in a manner all that is: the soul is the form of forms. Tranquility sudden, vast, candescent: form of forms” (30-1). Brivic asserts that the “‘Form of forms’ is clearly a definition of godhead, the first cause of everything else” (46), not to mention that “Aristotle, who made God a mind, is here interpreted so as to make the mind God” (46). This suggests that one cannot “go back to a genuine first principle” (*Republic* VI 511d) through the contemplation of forms, the “thought of thought” (*Ulysses* 30), and connect to the primal matter of being. If the mind is the first principal, and God’s mind is the origin of anything intelligible, then Stephen’s mind is the only genuine principle accessible to him.

Returning to the concept of the strand, the intertwined thread, leading back to the origins of mankind and creation at large, the first principle, Stephen is bound to a collective ethos, for “the words of all link back, strandentwining cable all flesh” (46). Stephen states that “there can be no reconciliation [...] if there has not been a sundering” (249), suggesting that, while Stephen acknowledges the lineage of mankind, linking it all the way back to its biblical origins, as “Kinch” (1), the knifeblade, he attempts to sunder himself from these recollections in order to forge “in the smithy of his soul, the uncreated conscience of his race” (*Portrait* 276). This quote raises two concepts: Plato’s theories on knowledge and the Lacanian internalization of language. Lacan argues that through the internalization of language, we are placed into a state of lack having internalized foreign signifiers. Language is inherently external; therefore, linguistic communication itself, especially in terms of written prose, is inorganic and contrived insofar as it can only be conveyed within the boundaries of foreign internalized signification. For instance, Stephen delineates: “Father, Word and Holy breath. Allfather, the heavenly man. Hiesos Kristos, magician of the beautiful, the Logos who suffers in us at every moment”

(*Ulysses* 237). Language, as a foreign internalization, “suffers in us at every moment” (237) because we are not born fluent in language. The mirror stage, according to Lacan, is the state of inherent self-satisfaction and complacency before the internalization of language. Moreover, through language, one is divorced from the mirror stage and placed into a state of lack because the reliance on language for thought and communication renders meaning inherently external. By acknowledging his status of lack, Stephen endeavors to sever himself from it in an attempt to return to the mirror stage of complacency and self-sufficiency, in the hopes of being able to create of himself, not being reliant on external influences. However, this is problematic insofar as he is a wordsmith, working within the logos of an external world. Stephen can only communicate by using foreign signs of signification, framing his fluidity within the parameters of intelligible language.

Language is not the only element in Stephen’s life that confines him. His dilemma of language, as being adopted tools of communication, resembles his attitude towards the past. Stephen famously states that “[h]istory [...] is a nightmare from which [he] is trying to awake” (42). While on the beach, Stephen ponders “these heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here. And there, the stoneheaps of dead builders, a warren of weasel rats. Hide gold there. Try it you have some. Sands and stones. Heavy of the past” (55-6), delineating how even the earth on which Stephen treads is laden with history. Everything material around him is a part of someone else’s history, someone else’s creation, thus playing on Plato’s theory of knowledge that “if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember” (*Meno* 86d). Stephen’s hyperconsciousness of the interconnectedness of humankind lends itself to

Plato's notion that we "need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to [ourselves], [our] soul[s] must have always possessed this knowledge" (86e) for if "[w]e always [possessed] this knowledge [we] would always have known; or if [we have] acquired the knowledge [we] could not have acquired it in this life" (86c). Therefore, the notion of recollected knowledge, of everyone being a product of someone else, linked in the larger chain of being, for someone like Stephen, is problematic. As such, Stephen opts to retire to the chambers of his mind, his creative sanctuary; however, this too is another trapping of history because, as I already discussed, language is a form of linguistic history.

In addition to the burden of history and language, Stephen struggles with inspiration. In "Proteus" Stephen says "[t]ouch me. Soft eyes. Soft soft soft hand. I am lonely here. O, touch me soon, now. What is that word known to all men?⁷ I am quiet alone. Sad too. Touch, touch me" (*Ulysses* 61), thus appealing to inspiration to resuscitate his artistic abilities. He is "quiet alone", silent and artless, "lonely" and uninspired, lacking and incomplete, "sad[ly]" unable to beget art of himself; therefore, this yearning to be touched insinuates that he needs something outside of himself in order to create within a world already created (by God). Stephen's plea to a divine muse, in a hyper-sexualized fashion, intimates that art is forged through a genre of fornication. This leads us to the nature of artistic [re]production.

A father is a "necessary evil" (266) because he is the fertilizer, the outside force necessary for creating life; however, "fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man" (266). In other words, paternity, as being immediately conscious of

⁷ Stephen's desire to know the "word known to all men" (61), suggests that he wants to know the word to make him known to all men. However, later on in the novel we find out that this word is "love." Don Gifford asserts that "the key to the mystery seems to be not the word itself but the word-made-manifest. Only in the experience of love can the word known to all men be truly known" (221), suggesting that Stephen is really asking how to manifest himself, his word, making him immortal.

one's 'fathering' something, is subordinate to the certainty of maternity; it is "unknown to man" until informed by woman, thus fatherhood is rooted within the hypothetical. Furthermore, fatherhood is the responsibility for what one considers to be one's own. Stephen describes it as "a mystical estate, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten" (266) insinuating that fatherhood is uncertain. It is "mystical" insofar as it operates on a suggestive, figurative, even metaphorical level; therefore, the role of the father is assumed, not absolute (especially in light of any infidelity on the woman's behalf).

In addition, the notion of "an apostolic succession"(266) echoes the progression of the "*nacheinander*"(45), literally translated as "one after another." Like Christ's apostles, fathers, once entrusted with the knowledge/gospel of their paternity, are dispatched on their duty of fatherhood. Stephen associates the "*nacheinander*" with the "ineluctable modality of the audible" (45) which Gifford links to Aristotle's argument in *De Sensu et Sensibili* saying that "the ear participates in (and thus can modify) the substances of what it hears" (44). Therefore, a father can participate in what he is informed of (being a father), and consequently, can deny or embrace his duty (as a father). A father can distance himself from what he has created, whereas a mother must bear that life into term. In relation to the notion of transparency, anyone can act like a father to a woman's child. Therefore, the transparency of fatherhood is obfuscated, and continuing with the Aristotelian analysis, there are "limits of the diaphane"⁸ (*Ulysses* 45). According to Aristotle, the

Translucent is a common 'nature' and power, capable of no separate existence of its own [...] But it is manifest that [the] [diaphane's] [...] bounding extreme

⁸ Translated as "translucent."

[limit] must be something real; and that colour is just the “something” we are plainly taught by facts----colour being actually either *at* the external limit, or being itself the limit (Gifford 45).

Using the diaphane as an analogy for fatherhood delineates that fatherhood is not a state, or quality, that can exist without something to be a father to. Like colour is something that one has been taught to identify, one’s paternity is informed by the knowledge that one is the father. Aligning ‘colour’ with external knowledge, paternity, being the external element of creation, is reliant on external informers. Therefore, the knowledge of paternity, like the knowledge of colour, is bound to knowledge itself. This is particularly interesting in light of the artist and his art insofar as “Stephen is [...] looking not for a father, either Simon Dedalus or Leopold Bloom, but for fatherhood. His own. And not biological, but artistic” (Murphy 3). In other words, Stephen is looking for inspiration to fuel his artistic abilities.

The enigma of paternity is accentuated through Stephen’s treatment of maternity. Stephen states that “Amor matris, subjective and objective genitive, may be the only true thing in life. Paternity may be a legal fiction. Who is the father of any son that any son should love him or he any son?” (*Ulysses* 266). This suggests that maternity is intimate and unquestionable. Whereas paternity is necessary to life, the external muse to art, the missing piece of fruition, it is still subjective, even “fictional.” Invariably, there is no denying maternity. This paradigm can also be interpreted on an allegorical level. While the artist/mother needs an inspiration/father to inseminate/impregnate the artist, the function of the father is questionable: either metaphorical/figurative, or tangible/corporeal, the father, in relation to creation, is essential⁹. However, maternity, as

⁹ Aside from God himself.

the act of creation itself, birthing, creating life and art, is brought into existence by the mother; therefore, the only participation necessary from the paternal perspective is a mere spark of inspiration which will be nursed into being/consciousness by the mother/artist. In relation to Stephen, his “organs of artistic generation, male and female, imagination and experience, have not managed to unite like the sexual organs of his own father and mother who ‘clasped and sundered. Did the couplers will’ (47)” (Murphy 10). Therefore, Stephen is strictly the material figure, in need of an external source of inspiration.

Stephen’s art is lacking. Considering that he cannot produce art without the influence of external sources, Stephen will never be able to create anything authentic. Stephen’s art is merely a (sub)conscious plagiarism of God’s creation. As such, Stephen’s dreams of immortality, the undercurrent thrust fueling his dreams of eternity, are subverted by his attitude of impious irreverence. When Stephen closes his eyes and reopens them, he admits “see now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be, world without end” (*Ulysses* 46), intimating that, on some level, his artistic ambitions are futile.

Works Cited

- Briciv, Sheldon. *Joyce the Creator*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Gifford, Don. *Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce's Ulysses*. California: University of California Press, 1988.
- Hyde, Douglas. "My Grief on the Sea." *The Oxford Book of English Verse: 1250–1900*. Ed. Arthur Quiller-Couch, 1919. <http://www.bartleby.com/101/858.html>
- Joyce, James. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. London: Penguin Classics, 2000.
- Joyce James. *Ulysses*. London: Penguin Classics, 2000.
- Milton, John. "Paradise Lost." *A Norton Critical Edition: Paradise Lost*. Ed. Gordon Teskey. New York : W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2005. 3-303.
- Murphy, Michael. "'Proteus' and Prose: Paternity or Workmanship in James Joyce's Ulysses." *James Joyce Quarterly*. 35 (1997) 71-81.
- Plato. "The Doctrine of Recollection: Socrates & the Slave Boy." *Meno*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. 80e-86d. <http://www2.una.edu/dburton/Plato%20Meno%20Socrates%20and%20Slave%20Boy%20Recollection.htm>
- Plato. *The Republic*. Trans.G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
- The Open Bible Expanded Edition: the New King James Version*. New York: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1983.